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PROGRESS REPORT

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PROGRESS REPORT

Implementation of the Movement Coordination for Collective Impact Agreement (Seville Agreement 2.0)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Four years after its adoption at the 2022 Council of Delegates, the Movement Coordination for Collective Impact Agreement (Seville Agreement 2.0 or SA 2.0) is increasingly becoming standard practice across the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Movement). Experience from recent contexts demonstrates that where Host National Societies (HNS) exercise their convening role, Mini-Summits are organized early on and strategic coordination mechanisms remain active, Movement partners are better able to align priorities, adapt decisions to changing circumstances and deliver a more coherent response. Similarly, investment in preparedness, trust and collective leadership has translated into more effective Movement coordination and should be systematically replicated across contexts.

The implementation of the SA 2.0 should not be viewed as the responsibility of any single institution. Its success depends on the collective commitment of all Movement components, HNS, Partner National Societies (PNS), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

This second progress report on the implementation of the SA 2.0 is submitted to the 2026 Council of Delegates for information, as a follow-up to Resolution 8 of the 2022 Council of Delegates and the first progress report, presented in November 2024. It also builds on the conclusions and recommendations of the final report on Strengthening Movement Cooperation and Coordination (SMCC) presented to the 2024 Council of Delegates.

The reporting period has seen a rapidly evolving humanitarian environment, characterized by increasing needs, a growing number of armed conflicts, internal strife, disasters and other crises, alongside increasingly constrained resources. In parallel, many United Nations' organizations, international non-governmental organizations and even Movement partners have scaled back or ceased their operations, often leaving vulnerable communities without adequate support. At the same time, the role and engagement of PNS continue to evolve, with some reducing their international operational footprint, while others are expanding their global engagement. These trends have placed considerable pressure on HNS, which must not only sustain existing services and institutional credibility, but also respond to growing needs in underserved communities. Increasingly, these communities are turning to National Societies for assistance as other humanitarian actors withdraw. These developments are reshaping how the Movement's collective action is organized.

Since the adoption of the SA 2.0 in June 2022, and particularly since the 2024 Council of Delegates marked the end of the SMCC as a stand-alone initiative, Movement coordination efforts have increasingly focused on mainstreaming the SA 2.0 into regular operational, management and governance practice. Progress made between 2024 and mid-2026 has cemented the SA 2.0 as the functional Movement coordination framework. This overall positive trajectory has been demonstrated by a clearer and more systematic alignment with the SA 2.0 framework in terms of coordination tools, training and decision-making practices, stronger institutionalization within the IFRC and the ICRC, and growing recognition of the central convening role of the HNS in situations triggering a collective Movement response. This is reflected, *inter alia*, in a significant expansion of country-level Movement Coordination Agreements, which have doubled in number from 20 to almost 40 during the reporting period.

Experience from recent operational contexts indicates that improved coordination has, in some cases, contributed to better complementarity and more coherent use of available resources. However, these effects remain uneven and are not yet supported by sufficiently robust data or monitoring systems to systematically demonstrate gains in efficiency or collective impact.

At the same time, collaboration across all Movement components, including HNS, PNS, the IFRC and the ICRC, has continued to mature, with stronger strategic dialogue at the leadership level and more pragmatic, context-adapted cooperation at country level. In several operational contexts, this has translated into earlier agreement on shared priorities and response objectives, a clearer division of roles and more effective complementarity in support of HNS.

While the SA 2.0 tools, such as Mini-Summits, Joint Statements and Movement Coordination Agreements, are more systematically used in major emergencies, their timeliness, consistency and operational follow-through vary across contexts. Persistent challenges include differences in the interpretation of roles and responsibilities, limited investment in HNS convening capacities, an uneven understanding and ownership of the SA 2.0, and insufficient follow-through and monitoring of collective commitments agreed through Mini-Summits and other strategic coordination mechanisms.

Operational learning further suggests that coordination outcomes depend not only on the availability of agreed tools, but on leadership behaviour, levels of trust among partners and the degree of preparedness.

Three critical areas emerge where further progress is required: first, achieving more consistent collective impact, including a stronger alignment of operational priorities and a clearer articulation of a collective Movement response; second, strengthening Movement communication and positioning, including the ability to develop a clear, concise and shared narrative, particularly in sensitive or high-visibility contexts; third, improving coordinated resource mobilization, ensuring that efforts across the Movement are aligned and mutually reinforcing.

This report highlights five overarching findings: (1) progress is most tangible where the SA 2.0 is embedded in preparedness planning and coordination in situations of “normalcy”; (2) the organization of a Mini-Summit in the first 48 hours of the crisis and active follow-up through strategic coordination mechanisms are important success factors; (3) the full exercise by the HNS of its convener role is critical; (4) leadership behaviour and incentives remain decisive factors for effective coordination; and (5) achieving gains in collective impact requires moving beyond process compliance towards stronger alignment of priorities and operational practices, including “functional cooperation” (as set out in Part III of the SA 2.0). This report concludes with targeted recommendations to consolidate gains and address remaining gaps ahead of the next reporting cycle.

In a context of growing needs and shrinking humanitarian resources, strengthening coordination and maximizing collective impact is not only a strategic objective, but a practical necessity for sustaining the Movement’s ability to deliver. Ensuring that our responses are effectively coordinated, anchored in our distinct yet complementary mandates and in full recognition of the central convening role of HNS, is essential to maintain relevance, maximize impact and uphold the trust placed in the Movement.

1) INTRODUCTION

The Movement operates in an increasingly complex humanitarian environment characterized by a growing number of armed conflicts, including protracted conflicts, climate-related disasters, public health emergencies, political polarization and declining financial resources.

The Movement is undergoing structural shifts: there are pressures on HNS to maintain their operational relevance and credibility, and changes in the role and engagement of PNS, with some reducing their international operations, while others are expanding their global footprint. In this context, effective coordination among Movement components is essential to maximize humanitarian impact, protect the humanitarian space and ensure principled and complementary action in support of affected people and communities.

The SA 2.0, adopted by the 2022 Council of Delegates, provides the Movement's updated normative framework for coordination, replacing the 1997 Seville Agreement and its Supplementary Measures. It places the HNS at the centre of Movement coordination and establishes mandatory coordination tools and mechanisms in situations triggering a collective response of the Movement (as defined in Article 5.4.1 of the SA 2.0).

The implementation of the SA 2.0 is therefore of direct relevance to vulnerable and crisis-affected populations, as successful coordination translates into faster response, optimization of resources, better coverage and quality of assistance. It is equally critical for National Societies to strengthen their central role, legitimacy and long-term development. Lastly, proper implementation of the SA 2.0 enhances predictable and coherent Movement action that is necessary to ensure the trust of the authorities and other external actors.

This progress report reviews the state of implementation four years after the adoption of the SA 2.0, with particular attention paid to developments since the 2024 Council of Delegates and to the application of the SA 2.0 in recent situations that have triggered a collective Movement response.

2) BACKGROUND

This report has been prepared as a follow-up to Resolution 8 of the 2022 Council of Delegates, which requested the ICRC and the IFRC, in collaboration with National Societies, to monitor and report on the implementation of the SA 2.0. It builds directly on:

- the first SA 2.0 progress report submitted to the 2024 Council of Delegates, including its recommendations
- the final report on the SMCC (2013–2024), which marked the transition from the SMCC to the full operationalization of the SA 2.0
- ongoing monitoring through common indicators, the joint tracking of coordination tools and consultations with the SA 2.0 Consultative Support Group (CSG) established under Resolution 8.

This report draws on operational experience from 2024–2026, including large-scale crises or emergencies and protracted crises, internal reviews, training feedback and exchanges within Movement coordination forums.

3) ANALYSIS AND PROGRESS

A. Strengthening Movement coordination at country level

Coordination in normalcy periods

Since the 2024 Council of Delegates, there has been a marked increase in the use of Movement Coordination Agreements (MCAs) as a foundation for coordination among Movement partners. The number of active MCAs increased from approximately 20 at the end

of 2024 to almost 40 by June 2026. New agreements have been concluded across all regions,¹ with several additional agreements currently in development.

This steady expansion confirms the growing acceptance of MCAs as a practical coordination tool and illustrates progress in embedding the SA 2.0 in routine coordination, beyond crisis-driven interactions. However, progress on the development of Movement contingency planning has been more limited. While recognized as a complex exercise, it remains critical to ensure that the Host National Society's contingency planning is developed in a coordinated manner with the ICRC and the IFRC, including through the integration of respective roles, capacities and expected contributions of all Movement components.

Coordination in operational situations

Between the third quarter of 2024 and June 2026, 11 contexts triggered a collective Movement response requiring strengthened coordination arrangements in line with the SA 2.0 (or a Mini-Summit confirmed the need to keep the convener/co-convener system already in place). These contexts included Lebanon, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen at the end of 2024; Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Myanmar and South Sudan in 2025; and Benin, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali and Venezuela in the first half of 2026.

In these contexts, the standard coordination tools foreseen under the SA 2.0 were systematically applied, including the convening of Mini-Summits,² the use of Decision Tables and the adoption of Joint Statements³ to clarify roles, responsibilities and collective direction. In parallel, targeted actions were implemented to strengthen Movement-wide communication and humanitarian diplomacy, including the development of coordinated key messages and guidance, as well as the timely organization of Movement calls to ensure alignment and information-sharing among partners. In addition, further efforts supported the development and publication of Movement coordination and communication tools such as the Movement Picture, notably in contexts such as Lebanon, Myanmar and Syria.

Learning from recent operational contexts suggests that while coordination tools are increasingly being applied, their effectiveness varies significantly depending on the context. Their use does not automatically result in alignment or collective impact. In practice, outcomes are strongly shaped by the ability of Movement partners to develop a shared analysis, align priorities early on in the response and operate with a common understanding of roles and objectives, which has, for instance, worked efficiently in South Sudan, through the different recent crises of cholera and escalations of conflict during the reporting period.

In addition, in a number of contexts where the crisis was important but not regarded by the Movement partners as requiring the formal triggering of a collective Movement response, it is worth observing that regular coordination exchanges and pragmatic collaboration contributed to maintaining the coherence of Movement action. These contexts included, among others, India–Pakistan, Iran, Jamaica, Mozambique and Venezuela (in early 2026).

In short, while some challenges remain (see Section C below), collaboration between the IFRC and the ICRC has continued to mature during the reporting period, with increased strategic dialogue at leadership level and more pragmatic, context-adapted engagement in operations. At the same time, coordination dynamics across the Movement remain uneven, including the level of engagement and ownership among National Societies, including PNS. In contexts where National Societies have fully assumed their convener role, where Mini-Summits were convened and functional strategic coordination mechanisms established, collaboration has improved significantly, resulting in more coherent decision-making, better alignment and more

¹ New MCAs in the reporting period include Nigeria, Somalia, Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, Angola, Mali, Sudan and South Sudan (Africa); Venezuela and Haiti (Americas); Syria, Yemen and Iraq (Middle East and North Africa); Bangladesh (Asia-Pacific); and Bulgaria, Serbia and Armenia (Europe).

² There were 15 Mini-Summits in total in the reporting period, with multiple Mini-Summits organized in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Lebanon.

³ There were, in total, 15 Joint Statements produced in the reporting period – one per Mini-Summit organized.

effective collective action. Ensuring consistent participation, alignment with collective priorities and regular organization of strategic coordination meetings to monitor the implementation of shared commitments made at a Mini-Summit remains a key challenge. Differences in approaches, incentives and external interests risk fragmenting the collective response if these are not addressed through more disciplined coordination.

Operational learning from recent contexts

Virtual exchanges with National Societies and Movement leaders from Afghanistan, Myanmar, South Sudan and Ukraine provided additional insights into the practical implementation of the SA 2.0. These discussions highlighted that, beyond formal coordination mechanisms, the effectiveness of Movement coordination largely depends on leadership behaviour, trust among partners and preparedness.

Across contexts, participants emphasized that the initial phase of a response, often within the first 24–48 hours, is critical for establishing a common understanding of the situation, clarifying leadership roles and setting the basis for effective coordination. Where alignment is achieved early on, coordination tends to be more coherent; where it is delayed, fragmentation is more likely to persist.

While some contexts reported improved complementarity and indications of a more efficient use of resources,⁴ participants also noted that such improvements remain difficult to measure, and that the Movement currently lacks a common approach for assessing collective impact in a consistent and evidence-based manner.

A recurring observation was the need to move beyond a primarily procedural application of the SA 2.0, which is focused on roles and coordination arrangements, towards a more outcome-oriented approach centred on collective impact, complementarity and operational effectiveness.

The discussions also confirmed that although the central role of the HNS is widely recognized, its effective operationalization remains uneven, particularly in terms of the capacities and resources of the HNS, as well as consistent support from Movement partners.

B. Seville Agreement 2.0 implementation enablers

The increased application of the SA 2.0 in operations has generated practical questions requiring further clarification of the normative framework, including the distinction between co-convener and non-co-convener roles, coordination in concurrent disaster and conflict settings, and transition phases between different types of crises.

Building on the work of the IFRC and the ICRC through their Movement coordination in operations working group, including the finalization of the co-convener table and its annex on concurrent situations endorsed at the 2024 Council of Delegates, the working group has continued to analyse key concepts to facilitate more consistent and pragmatic implementation of the agreement. One of the key outcomes during the reporting period was the finalization of the ICRC Conflict and Related Complex Crisis Response Security Management Support Framework Agreement, which establishes a pre-agreed security support arrangement when the ICRC assumes a co-convener role.

Dissemination and operational uptake were supported through regional SA 2.0 orientation sessions for National Society leaders, and for IFRC and ICRC staff in Europe, the Americas and Asia-Pacific. In 2026, specific orientation sessions on the co-convener table were held in the Europe region. Parallel to this, the IFRC and the ICRC supported the development of

⁴ In South Sudan, the triggering of a collective Movement response in late 2024 was followed by three Mini-Summits and strengthened Movement coordination arrangements. Since then, the Movement has reached more people than in 2023, despite operating with more constrained overall resources.

regional plans of action for Movement coordination, with Europe and the Americas identifying strategic priorities, priority contexts for investment, and training and dissemination schedules.

C. Remaining challenges and corrective steps

Despite the progress outlined above, implementing the SA 2.0 in situations triggering a collective Movement response continues to raise a number of challenges. These include differing interpretations of mandates and roles, and occasional tensions between the IFRC and the ICRC in relation to the application of the co-convenor role, particularly in concurrent situations. While this has resulted in delays in agreeing on collective courses of action, it has not significantly affected the operational delivery of individual Movement components. Related concerns have been expressed regarding perceived overlap or insufficient complementarity in operational decision-making, public communication and humanitarian diplomacy. There is always an ongoing risk of reverting to institution-centric approaches, which must be guarded against as they significantly detract from the Movement's collective impact. These challenges also highlight the need for greater accountability across all Movement components to ensure adherence to agreed coordination frameworks. Learning from recent operational contexts suggests that many of these challenges are not primarily due to the absence of coordination tools, but rather to differences in leadership behaviour, institutional incentives and levels of trust among Movement partners.

In addition, greater clarity and investment are required in relation to the convening role of the HNS. While the SA 2.0 places the HNS at the centre of Movement coordination, which is widely recognized and accepted, challenges remain in ensuring a consistent understanding of this role, as well as in strengthening the capacities of, confidence among and support from all Movement partners required for the HNS to effectively exercise its convening responsibilities within its context.

Challenges persist in relation to resource mobilization and the alignment of funds with collective Movement priorities. In a context of constrained funding, competition for resources among Movement components and beyond continues to affect overall coherence and the level of support given to the HNS. At the same time, in many contexts, HNS are increasingly engaged in the implementation of programmes on behalf of external actors, including the United Nations, which can further stretch their capacities and create additional complexity in aligning resources with Movement priorities. Strengthening coordinated approaches to resource mobilization, improving transparency and ensuring that funding effectively reinforces the collective Movement response remain critical areas for further attention. Limited visibility on how resources contribute to collective outcomes further complicates the ability to assess whether coordination efforts are translating into improved efficiency or impact.

Furthermore, despite the availability of coordination tools and mechanisms, the Movement continues to face difficulties in consistently articulating a clear and concise joint Movement narrative reflecting the collective intent and response direction agreed at a Mini-Summit, including through public communication or humanitarian diplomacy. The ability to rapidly develop and communicate shared positioning is not yet consistent and requires further attention to ensure coherence, credibility and collective impact. The ability to develop a shared narrative is closely linked to the capacity of Movement partners to establish a common analysis of the situation. Where such shared analysis is lacking, coordination tends to remain fragmented and the articulation of collective intent becomes more complex.

Similarly, high-intensity crises continue to expose challenges in the timely development and agreement of a collective Movement response. These include difficulties in aligning a joint Movement response plan, or in ensuring timely coordination and complementarity between the HNS response plan, the ICRC operational plan and budget extensions, and the IFRC Emergency Appeal.

Operational experience during the reporting period also highlights persistent gaps in preparedness and ownership of the SA 2.0. Contexts where coordination relationships, roles and expectations had been discussed in advance generally demonstrated swifter alignment and more coherent responses. Beyond training, preparedness for coordination includes joint planning, scenario discussions, and investment in developing trust and working relationships. Similarly, while progress has been made in dissemination and ownership of the SA 2.0 compared with the previous reporting period, further efforts are required. The roll-out of SA 2.0 orientation and training sessions remains uneven across regions, and individual interpretations of roles still, at times, overshadow agreed frameworks.

In response to these challenges and building on the findings and recommendations of the 2024 SA 2.0 progress report and the SMCC final report, a number of corrective measures have been undertaken jointly by the IFRC and the ICRC. Structured dialogue at the leadership and technical levels has contributed to the clarifying of expectations, the reaffirming of mandates, and the promotion of a more pragmatic and solution-oriented application of the SA 2.0, particularly in complex and sensitive contexts. The use of agreed reference tools, including the ICRC–IFRC co-convenor role table and its annex on concurrent situations, has helped reduce ambiguity and facilitated more constructive engagement at country level.

In addition, the finalization of the convener table (annexed to this report) – developed by the CSG, which is composed of eight National Societies, the IFRC and the ICRC – represents a key milestone in the operationalization of the SA 2.0. It provides practical, shared guidance on the exercise of the convener role and constitutes a concrete contribution to clarifying roles, reducing ambiguity and strengthening consistency in country-level coordination. Discussions within the CSG also highlighted the importance of balancing the clarity of roles with operational pragmatism and flexibility, ensuring that coordination arrangements remain adapted to context-specific realities.

Operational practice since late 2024 demonstrates tangible learning and improvements. In several recent emergencies and fragile contexts, Movement components have worked with greater complementarity, mutual respect and focus on collective impact. Positive examples include joint Movement engagement supporting the Red Cross Field Hospital in Rafah, Gaza, and coordinated operational alignment in South Sudan, the coordinated response to the earthquake in Afghanistan (September 2025), strengthened cooperation in the context of internal strife in Haiti (from September 2025), and improved complementarity in the conflicts affecting the Middle East (2026), and the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2026). In these situations, earlier engagement, a clearer division of responsibilities and more consistent support to HNS leaders contributed to more effective coordination and reduced friction.

Lastly, the SMCC toolkit has been revised to include the latest developments and good practice. It is available online at: <https://movement-coordination.org>.

4) IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING

As a follow-up to Resolution 8 of the 2022 Council of Delegates, the IFRC and the ICRC have continued to apply common indicators⁵ related to tools and activities to assess progress in implementing the SA 2.0, alongside a joint tracking of coordination tools such as Mini-Summits and MCAs, with a focus on learning and improving operational effectiveness. Similarly, the CSG, which is composed of representatives from eight National Societies, the ICRC and the

⁵ See Resolution 8, "Movement Coordination for Collective Impact Agreement (Seville Agreement 2.0)", Council of Delegates, June 2022, CD/22/R8, operative paragraph 4, which requests that "the ICRC and the IFRC, in collaboration with National Societies, develop relevant indicators and a means of tracking progress ...".

IFRC, was established to support the monitoring and implementation of the SA 2.0,⁶ capture learning from operational practice and advise on priority improvements. The insights and inputs generated through the CSG have also contributed to informing the analysis and findings of this report.

Between 2024 and 2026, monitoring efforts focused primarily on learning rather than compliance, seeking to better understand enabling and constraining factors affecting effective Movement coordination across contexts. While this approach has strengthened qualitative understanding, as indicated above, further refinement of indicators remains necessary to better demonstrate links between strengthened coordination practices and enhanced operational outcomes and collective impact.

The CSG's contribution during the reporting period has been affected by uneven engagement among its National Society members and resource constraints, which have limited the scope and continuity of its activities.

5) CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A central lesson from the reporting period is that achieving collective impact requires prioritizing the interests of the Movement over individual institutional interests. Four years after its adoption, the trajectory of implementation has been generally positive, and it is now firmly established as the Movement's functional normative framework for coordination. Since the 2024 Council of Delegates, there have been tangible improvements and progress made in mainstreaming the SA 2.0, including increased and more systematic use of coordination tools, such as Mini-Summits, Joint Statements and Movement Coordination Agreements, as well as strengthened leadership awareness and more structured engagement between the IFRC and the ICRC.

At the same time, experience across recent operational contexts confirms that while these tools and processes provide a strong foundation, their effective application remains context-dependent. Coordination outcomes continue to depend not only on the existence of agreed frameworks, but also on leadership behaviour, levels of trust among partners and the degree of preparedness for collective action. In several situations, improved coordination has contributed to stronger complementarity and more coherent responses. However, such gains are not yet systematically evidenced and remain difficult to measure in the absence of a robust and shared approach to assessing collective impact.

The reporting period also highlights that while the central convening role of HNS is widely recognized, its consistent operationalization remains a work in progress. Gaps in capacity, uneven alignment of Movement partners and constraints in resource mobilization continue to affect the ability of HNS to fully exercise their leadership role across contexts.

More broadly, the key challenge for the coming years is to move from improved processes to demonstrable gains in collective impact, ensuring that coordination consistently translates into better outcomes for affected people.

In a global environment characterized by increasing humanitarian needs and shrinking financial resources, strengthening coordination and maximizing collective impact is not optional. It is a necessary condition for ensuring that the Movement can continue to deliver meaningful assistance at scale and maintain its operational credibility.

Building on the progress achieved and the lessons and challenges identified in this report, National Societies, the ICRC and the IFRC are encouraged to focus on the following key areas.

⁶ See Resolution 8, "Movement Coordination for Collective Impact Agreement (Seville Agreement 2.0)", Council of Delegates June 2022, CD/22/R8, operative paragraph 5. Eight National Societies, representing the four IFRC statutory regions, are members of the group: the Central African Republic, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq, Mexico, Somalia, Spain and Ukraine.

Strengthening collective impact and operational alignment

- Further institutionalize the SA 2.0 in preparedness and contingency planning, training and performance management systems.
- Promote early and systematic development of a shared analysis and aligned priorities in the initial phase of crises.
- Align operational strategies and response plans around shared Movement priorities.
- Promote leadership accountability for Movement coordination at all levels, including through incentives and appraisal mechanisms.
- Invest systematically in HNS convening capacities, linking operational coordination support with longer-term National Society Development.
- Ensure decisions are taken, to the greatest extent possible, by the Movement's partners operating at the local level.

Strengthening Movement narrative, positioning and collective intent

- Enhance the quality, timeliness and effectiveness of Mini-Summits and Joint Statements to ensure a clear articulation of the Movement's collective intent and strategic direction.
- Strengthen the Movement's ability to develop and communicate joint positioning, including in public communication and humanitarian diplomacy, ensuring the coherence, credibility and visibility of its collective action.
- Clarify and operationalize the complementarity between membership coordination and Movement coordination, particularly in situations triggering a collective response.

Strengthening coordinated resource mobilization and efficiency

- Promote more coordinated and disciplined approaches to resource mobilization, ensuring alignment with collective Movement priorities and reducing competition between Movement components.
- Improve transparency and complementarity in the use of resources, with particular attention paid to directing funding in support of HNS priorities.
- Encourage greater consideration of cost-effectiveness and operational efficiency in coordinated responses.

Strengthening the monitoring of, learning from and evidence of collective impact

- Continue refining approaches to monitoring in order to better evidence the operational impact of Movement coordination.
- Develop practical approaches and indicators to better assess collective impact and complementarity, including the efficiency of coordinated responses.
- Strengthen the use of learning processes, including peer exchange and operational reviews, to capture and disseminate lessons on effective Movement coordination.